Mixed coordination mechanisms for scheduling games on hierarchical machines

In this paper, we study scheduling games under mixed coordination mechanisms on hierarchical machines. The two scheduling policies involved are ‐ and ‐, where ‐ (resp., ‐) policy sequences jobs in nondecreasing order of their hierarchies, and jobs of the same hierarchy in nonincreasing (resp., nondecreasing) order of their processing times. We first show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Then we present the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the games with social costs of minimizing the makespan and maximizing the minimum machine load. All the bounds given in this paper are tight.     

Design of minimax robust LQG controllers under parameter and noise uncertainties

The problem of design of minimax robust LQG controllers for linear systems with parameter and noise uncertainties is considered in this paper. Necessary and sufficient conditions for converting this problem to a two-person, zero-sum continuous game problem are presented. A simple procedure for design of a suboptimal minimax robust LQG controller, i.e., the LQG controller for least-favourable model, is proposed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a saddle point are established. Under these conditions, the controller obtained is exactly the minimax LQG controller. When there does not exist a saddle point, the worst-case error between the controller obtained and the minimax robust LQG controllers under described uncertainties is bounded.     

Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate

Learning to act in a multiagent environment is a difficult problem since the normal definition of an optimal policy no longer applies. The optimal policy at any moment depends on the policies of the other agents. This creates a situation of learning a moving target. Previous learning algorithms have one of two shortcomings depending on their approach. They either converge to a policy that may not be optimal against the specific opponents' policies, or they may not converge at all. In this article we examine this learning problem in the framework of stochastic games. We look at a number of previous learning algorithms showing how they fail at one of the above criteria. We then contribute a new reinforcement learning technique using a variable learning rate to overcome these shortcomings. Specifically, we introduce the WoLF principle, “Win or Learn Fast”, for varying the learning rate. We examine this technique theoretically, proving convergence in self-play on a restricted class of iterated matrix games. We also present empirical results on a variety of more general stochastic games, in situations of self-play and otherwise, demonstrating the wide applicability of this method.     

会计信息失真现象的博弈分析

在对现实进行合理假定的基础上建立了会计信息失真现象的有限完美信息动态博弈模型，并利用后退归纳法找到了五个满足不同条件的纳什均衡解。通过对均衡条件的分析，找出了导致会计信息失真的治理结构原因和法律制度因素，并提出了建设性的解决措施。     

A constructive approach to sequential Nash equilibria

We present a Coq-formalized proof that all non-cooperative, sequential games have a Nash equilibrium point. Our proof methodology follows the style advocated by LCF-style theorem provers, i.e., it is based on inductive definitions and is computational in nature. The proof (i) uses simple computational means, only, (ii) basically is by construction, and (iii) reaches a constructively stronger conclusion than informal efforts. We believe the development is a first as far as formalized game theory goes.     

Coding distributive lattices with Edge Firing Games

In this note, we show that any distributive lattice is isomorphic to the set of reachable configurations of an Edge Firing Game. Together with the result of James Propp, saying that the set of reachable configurations of any Edge Firing Game is always a distributive lattice, this shows that the two concepts are equivalent.     

Dynamics stability in wireless sensor networks active defense model

Wireless sensor networks, which are widely used in military, industrial and transportation fields, are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks, since they are mostly deployed in a relatively open environment. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes a proactive defense model for wireless sensor networks, in which we emphasize that the node has a limited ability to learn the evolution of rationality from different attack strategies of the attacker, and can dynamically adjust their strategies to achieve the most effective defense. Following this approach, the cost (e.g., energy consumption and wastage of machinery) has been greatly saved and the life cycle of the nodes has been extended as well. By employing the proposed model, the whole wireless sensor network can be implemented in an effective way.     

基于非理性博弈的舆情传播仿真建模研究

随着社交网络的不断发展,借助社交网络进行传播的舆情信息的威胁越来越大. 本文利用博弈论的方法研究了舆情信息的传播机制,从理性博弈和非理性博弈的角度出发对个体与邻居的交互行为进行建模. 随后以目前较为成熟的传染病模型为基础,通过引入传播学中的社会威慑因素来构建基于非理性博弈的舆情传播模型,以实现适应舆情传播研究的仿真系统,继而将基于非理性博弈的舆情传播模型在无标度网络和小世界网络上的动力学特征进行理论分析. 在仿真环境中对非理性博弈的舆情传播模型进行实验,分析模型参数、网络密度和舆情传播源对舆情传播的影响,其结果符合理论分析结果. 最后对无标度网络上舆情传播的控制策略进行了研究,包括:社会威慑方法、目标免疫方法和正面消息方法,为社交网络上的政策制定提供了理论基础.     

船舶多出口房间疏散问题研究

为了提高船舶人员疏散效率,针对船舶火灾情况下多出口房间的人员疏散,提出了结合博弈论和社会力模型的疏散优化模型.模型考虑了人员之间的相互作用、人员到出口的距离和出口大小对人员选择出口的影响,用博弈理论得出多出口条件下人员个体的最优决策路线,并对社会力模型中人员动力学进行修正,作为新模型中人员运动的动力学基础.用新模型对多出口无障碍房间进行人员疏散仿真,结果显示,上述模型可以仿真出人员在多出口房间中对出口的优化选择,并能改善基础社会力模型中存在的不足.仿真结果表明,上述模型能有效缩短人员逃离房间的时间,并能模拟多出口条件下人员疏散的场景,为规划和管理多出口房间的疏散提供参考.